SOLAS AND ARTISANAL FISHERMEN: LESSONS FROM OCKHI

#300daysafterCycloneOckhi  #VareethiahKonstantine

Mass casualties in the deep sea due to Cyclone Ockhi 2017 expose the fatal inadequacy ofour Early Warning System, colossal failure in Search and Rescue operations and lacunae in on board safety protocols in mechanised fishing vessels. What is the take home lesson?

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SOLAS AND ARTISANAL FISHERMEN: LESSONS FROMOCKHI

Dr. K. Vareethiah.

Email:vareeth59@gmail.com| BlogSpot: Vareethiah.com | Fb: VareethiahKonstantine

0.0. Prelude

0.1. Reckoning with Reality

Cyclone ‘Ockhi 2017’ took away over 230 lives (from Tamil Nadu alone) in the deep sea. Majority of these deaths occurred in post cyclone situation largely due to failure in Early Warning System (EWS) and Search and Rescue operations (SAR). The episode once again exposed the gap in on board Sea Safety Protocols and Communication devices in the small scale deep sea Mechanised Fishing Vessels (MFVs).

0.2. Invisible Disaster on Invisible People

As for the maritime communities, Cyclone Ockhi was ‘an invisible disaster on an invisible people’. The casualty of this mid sea disaster was the bread winners of fishing families. In a situation where fisherwomen are alienated from small scale fishery economy, the reconstruction of livelihood for these destitute is a great challenge. Could these deaths have been averted? Was it a collective failure? What are the lessons learnt?

0.3. Cultural Sensitivity and People’s Participation.

I have had the opportunity to travel the length and breadth of the Indian peninsular coast and the Andaman. With my post tsunami experience in Tamil Nadu, I may safely make this statement: ‘Disaster reconstruction involves, among others, two salient features- Cultural Deconstruction and People's Participation’. I had seen for myself, 2001 Bhuj earth quake reconstruction is a positive example where 'Sensitivity to Ethnic Life' and 'Participatory Development' were the guiding principles. I believe, these principles equally apply to disaster mitigation.The fisher folks are invisible in literature, absent from history and remain geo-politically and economically marginalized. One’s capacity to respond to a disaster situation and to participate in reconstruction is largely a function of both these factors.

0.4. Technologisation and Tribal Instinct

Death and uncertainty are the seminal elements of traditional maritime life. One of the chief attributes of the tribal instinct is its keen sense of nature. However, his traditional faith makes him believe that ‘he can tide over any danger and get to the shore safely’. This is a historical hangover he must quickly relieve himself of. Fishing within a distance coverable in day light hours was commonplace in pre-technology times; high tech, high investment, multiday deep sea venture is common practice today. Technologisationhas changed the face of marine fisheriessector. It follows that traditional perceptions of safety needs a thorough overhauling. It is time the seafaring artisans reckoned with this reality.

0.5. Working smart at sea

A smart seafarer has got to think smart in terms of safety of human life and that of his vessel, his life time investment. Safety of life at sea is not about high investments and high end technologies; it is about a basic change in attitude. The causes for negligence in on board safety practices need to be addressed (with empathy) to plug the leak. This also calls for an objective, retrospective analysis of the Governments' ‘Disaster Preparedness' and their 'Political will' to respond during the 'Golden period' pertaining to a disaster.

1.0.Traditional Deep Sea Fishermen

1.1. The Thoothoor Fishermen.

After the Sri Lankans, the Thoothoor fishermen are the most innovative/ efficient deep sea fisher folks in south Asia. They have got a long tradition of Multi-day fishing cruises with in Kattamarans/ country boats. These fishermen who are smart with latest fishing technologies are not negligent in basic sea safety protocols. Unlike Sri Lankans, are ill equipped with communication devices. This is an area that requires the governments’ empathy.

1.2. Protein Demand and Marine Fisheries

Mechanised Fishing in India was introduced in India in 1956 (II FYP/ Indo Norwegian Project, Indo- Belgian Project) with thrust on trawling, Mechanised Trawlers were introduced in Tamil Nadu (Colachel and Thoothoor in KKDt). Deep sea fisheries programme was initiated in 1985. Mechanised Fishing, with a fleet strength of @80,000, constitutes a major industry as small scale fisheries sector. Over the decades, fishing pressure in near shore waters has increased due to excessive investment in fleet strength (MFVs, OBM Boats) and sharp fall in CPUE rendering fishing a thankless venture. Annual Fish production has been plummeting over the years with growth rate in fish landing decimating from 6.3% (1970-’71) to 0.0% (2010-’11). Rising crises in near-shore waters is further aggravated by destructive fishing methods (Trawling/ Purse seining), marine pollution, water policy and climate change/ El Nino Effects. The union and state governments have recognised deep sea fishing as a tangible solution to issues of cross border fishing in international waters and has launched deep sea fisheries programme in the last couple of years. The programme focuses on using the fishing expertise of Thoothoor fishermen to train other fishermen in Tamil Nadu.

The domestic need for fish protein is on a steady rise while <50% of this need is catered to. Over 50 lakh workforce isengaged in Indian small scale fisheries. Each of these fishermen provides 16 jobs on land through backward and forward integration.

1.3. Deep Sea Fisheries as Small Scale Enterprises.

The Indian Small-scale deep sea fisheriesismainly credited to a fleet of @700 MFVs from Thoothoor region with a work force of @7000. Venturing all over the west coast from Kannyakumari to Okha they fish in the far reaches of the ocean. This fleet engages in bottom lining and gill netting in the deep seas; part of this fleet uses pelagic lines in open ocean (with depths >1000m). Each cruise (of a MFV) takes 25 to 40 days. A 60ft Deep sea MFV with a pay load of 40 tonnes (Ice blocks alone weighs @20t) and engine capacity of 120HP, could achieve a maximum speed of 8knots/hr in a normal weather. It employs highly efficient and resource friendly fishing techniques like light, baitless baits, live baits etc. Long lining, one of their specialities, involves the use of over 1000 hooks with swivels in a single line. Major fishery of this deep sea fleet includes sharks and rays, yellow fin tuna, skip jack tuna, snappers, groupers, marlin, Malabar trevally, sail fish, sword fish and emperor.The target fishery, fishing grounds and fishing methods of these migrant fishermen are neither competition with local fisher folks nor is it conflicting with national interest in terms of ecology/biodiversity.

1.4. Marine Fisheries- a complex subject.

Fisheries remain a 'State Subject'; however, the maritime states have their jurisdiction up to 12NM. Framing/ reviewing deep sea fisheries policy is a complex exercise enlisting the participation of/ endorsement from over 14 Union /State Govt. departments and, some international regulations too.

1.5. Legal Instruments

Article 116 of the UNCLOS (1982) recognises the sovereign right of citizens from maritime nations to fish on the high seas.  Article 6.18 of the FAO CCRF (1995) asserts the sovereign rights of fishermen to engage in subsistence / small scale/ artisanal fisheries and their preferential access to resources in waters of their national jurisdiction. Healthy standards in fishing operations, integration of SAR systems with fishing operations and access of fishing vessels to insurance coverage are categorically addressed in Article 8.1.5, 8.1.6 and 8.2.8 of the above document. The scope of IC-SOLAS, signed after the 1912 Titanic episode, is ‘safety of life at sea’.

1.6. The Indian EEZ and Deep Sea Fishermen.

India has got an EEZ of 2.02million SqKm; there is an additional area up to a distance of 150NM of international waters. In 2011 India has placed a request to the UN to declare this area as part of its EEZ. Though India has stopped LoP Programme, 193 international fishing vessels continue to engaging in ‘Indiscriminate, Unregulated, Unreported and Destructive’ fishing (IUUD) in our waters with an Indian licence/permit under the ‘Joint Venture’ (1991) programme. The wealth of marine fishery needs to be tapped to the full, to meet the ever rising domestic demand for fish protein. Besides, it is an employment provider, foreign exchange earner. Policies/ programmes with thrust on optimal utilisation of fishery resources beyond 50m depth will fortify the nation’s food security, public health and economy.

2. Cyclone Ockhi- An Introspection.

2.1. A Few Basic Questions

2.1.1. Given an early warning, could the MFVs avert the deep sea disaster?To some extent, yes.On the day of Ockhidisaster the MFVs claim, they were within a distance of 35 to 150NM. With a three day cyclone warning in place, MFVs could cover @500NM (at the mercy of weather) and safely berth at the nearest coast. The fishermen are very familiar with the islands and even with an 18hr warning, most of the MFVs and OBMs could have get to the shore.

2.1.2. The fishermen complain,a mere weatherwarning was of no avail…Their concern is genuine. A mere cyclone warning could be counter-productive.Geo spatial information pertaining to wind speed, direction and path of the cyclone are critical in decision making.The Sri Lankan MFVs got the technical information in time and could save themselves from the onslaught.

2.1.3. Was the Post Cyclone SAR operation effective?Fishermen caught in the cyclone and rescued/ landed claimed that the casualties on the strike of cyclone were nominal and that most deaths occurred in the next couple of days due to lapse in SAR. Negligence in life safety measures on board compounded the heavy casualties.

2.1.4. Do the Deep Sea MFVs have devices to receive early warning /weather updates?No.VHF can receive signals within 30nm in a normal weather.HF Radios can receive signals up to a distance of 200nm.RTM/Satellite Phone can reach any distance. SSB Radio would be handy to receive regular weather updates. The DAS is at experimental level only.Sri Lanka issues licence for satellite phone to its deep sea MFVs. They got the cyclone warning in time and saved themselves from the onslaught. Not a single MFV was caught in the cyclone.

2.1.5. Ten months after the disaster, what are the corrective measures from the Governments?The interventions of TN State Govt. are mainly focussed on the basic safety standards, life-saving and communication devices for deep sea MFVs. The Govt. is working with national agencies including ISRO in this regard.Other safetyrequirements are:High Bulwark, Emergency Bilge Pump,high bulwark and Hatch cover ceiling lock (to handle water ingress; Bilge Keels rolling effect and draft; Fire Safety arrangements like Fire Pump, CO2 cylinder, Dry Chemical Powder.

2.2. Gaps in Policies and Practice

2.2.1. Freakish Cyclone or Fatal Error?

Disaster management is essentially a political process in which the governments and people are the prime players. Cyclone Ockhi turned into a major disaster mainly due to the failure in early warning system. Unlike an earth quake or an avalanche, we do have a time reliefin the case of cyclone which gives us a warning in advance. Conventional technologies provide for a minimum of three day warning in India. The Indian Meteorological department (IMD) claimed that only 18 hour warning was possible due to its freakish nature. Ockhi is the second such disaster in the last 125 years. ‘It was a fatal error of judgement on the part of IMD’, hold the social activists.

2.2.2. Communication Failure

Secondly, there was a colossal failure in communication (NDMA, TNSDMA). “...the cyclone warning was delayed; the delivery of warning was ineffective;in a war like situation, a war-like mobilisation and action were missing...', holds Devasagayam, a former IAS officer. The extant MMD/ DG Shipping rules don’t permit the use of advanced communication devices in deep sea MFVs.

2.2.3. Lapse in SAR.

There was a lapse in SAR operations.There was failure in Overall SAR Coordination (NDRF).The Report of the Public inquest on Cyclone Ockhi says, “Ockhi  experience proved that the Tamil Nadu Disaster Management Authority (TNSDMA) and its agency are not fully operational and functional.” The functioning of the Coastal Disaster Risk Reduction Force was invisible. Further, centre- state Coordination in Disaster Management (like the one seen in Odisha 2013 CyclonePhaelin) was prominently missing.Odisha which lost nearly 13000 lives in the 1999 super cyclone, moved over 11,25,000 people to safety. The casualty was only 11.

2.2.4. Traditional Expertise and Advanced Technologies

The governments failed (or was unwilling) to utilise the traditional knowledge of the fishermen in SAR operations.Satellite imageries were apparently not utilized in SAR operations (Remote Sensing/ GIS). Fishermen who were in distress complained about poor response to DAS/ SOS calls. It seems no lessons have been learnt from Cyclone Phean 2009. It must be noted here, that the National Disaster Management Act (2005),  National Disaster Management Policy (2009) and National Disaster Management Plan (2016) are devoid of protocols for mid sea disaster management.

2.2.3. The Deep Sea MFVs

As for the safety protocols and practices in the deep sea MFVs, much needs to be done. In the first place sea safety culture and practices are wanting among artisanal fisherfolks.Lack of basic safety provisions on-board (Life jacket, Life buoy, Life Raft…) is a manifestation of this negligence. Non-compliance to safety specifications in deep sea fishing vessel construction (Design) has proved fatal. There are also irregularities with reference to vessel registration and insurance practices. Unlike the Sri Lankan Mechanised Fishing vessels, the Thoothoor MFVs lack state-of-the-art communication gadgets on board. The crew in Indian MFVs lack the expertise/ training in modern weather watch system and safety practices. Some of these factors add to disaster casualty.

3.0. Road Ahead

In the light of the above, here are some pointers for future course of action:

3.1. The NDMAct (2005)/ Policy/ Plan documents to address mid sea DM. Review on the effectiveness of NDRForce’s response with reference to Cyclone Ockhi.

3.2. Ensuring the participation of every State Govt. as partner and beneficiary of the National Cyclone Management Programme.

3.3. Streamlining the Coastal Disaster Risk Reduction Project (CDRRP).

3.4. Exploring the process for licence for satellite phoneto deep sea MFVs under the regulations of MMD (DG Shipping).

3.5. Unscrupulous enforcement of Registration and Insurance for every Indian MFV to be enforced.

3.6. The Governments may explore the prospects of a comprehensive insurance policy for MFVs all over India to ease the burden of artisanal fishermen.

3.7. Installation of SSB Radio and Distress Alert System (DAS) in every deep sea MFV.

3.8. Broadcast of Weather watch news in regional languages also.

3.9. Ensuring compliance of MFV building units all over India to MMD approved standards of construction design (that satisfies basic safety norms).

3.10. Periodic survey/ certification of sea worthiness of vessels.

3.11. Opening a regional unit of DM/ Rescue Coordination at Thengappattanam Fishing Harbour (To create a Registry of Geo-positions of fishing locations of deep sea MFVs; to maintain a movement log for MFVs at shore).

3.12. Basic training/ Certification for deep sea fishermen on SOP in sea safety and communication.

3.13. Establishment of Civilian unit of Maritime/ Coastal Warden with deep sea fishermen for mid sea SAR operations (The recent example of the Govt. of Kerala is worth emulating).

3.14. Special recruitment of traditional sea farers in Coast Guard.

3.15. Technology development for Location and Tracking of MFVs; RFID for every vessel).

3.16. Bringing the MFVs/ OBM Boats under satellite live mapping.

3.17. SAR: Helipad, helicopter, hovercraft, sea planes, speed boats for rescue at the SAR Coordination centre.

3.18. Periodic interactions with fishermen to understand their needs and to assess ground realities.

                   

                                                                     

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Acknowledgements: The following persons are gratefully acknowledged for consultancy on sea safety protocols: Capt. ReteshSinha, Mr.ManuAgarval (Chief Officer) and Mr. Jefferson Marcose (Senior Engineer), Passenger Ship; Mr. Thomas Soosai Antony (FG Master) and Mr.AlbertSilvarian (Engineer), Mercantile Vessel; Mr.MichaelNayagam (Rtd skipper) andMr. Maria Vijayan (Skipper), Mr.Bosco, Mr. Rajesh (Engineers), fishing vessel; Mr.Michael Faraday and Mr. Pius (crew heads), deep sea MFV; Mr.H.JohnBritto (Ship Location and tracking Software Specialist); Mr. Cyril Alex (Software Consultant and writer).